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Comments
ATTORNEY LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL
MALPRACTICE IN MISSOURI
I. INIRODUCMON
Attorney malpractice should concern all practicing attorneys. It has a
definite economic impact, it adversely affects the public image of the bar,
and it represents a breach of the ethical responsibility to represent clients
competently.' Although the present economic impact of malpractice is not
great for attorneys,2 the number of claims and recoveries is increasing, result-
ing in higher insurance rates and increasing risk. From the standpoint of both
economics and professional pride, attorneys have an interest in maintaining
public confidence in their competence and integrity.
Aside from these considerations, which arise largely from self-interest,
the attorney has a responsibility to be knowledgeable in the malpractice
area in order to properly advise clients. Though an attorney may shrink
from the unpleasant task of suing a fellow member of his profession, the
duty exists nonetheless. An attorney should be as capable of recognizing
the potential attorney malpractice action and advising his client thereon as
he is in other areas of the law.3 This comment is intended to aid the prac-
ticing attorney in recognition and analysis of the attorney malpractice claim.
II. ATroRNEY MALPRtACicn AS A NEGLicEmcE ArION
A. In General
An action for attorney malpractice is essentially a negligence action.4
There is, of course, a contract between the attorney and his client, and the
attorney may be liable for its breach. In addition to contractual liability,
however, the attorney can also be liable in tort for failure to exercise rea-
sonable care in performing his services. Under either theory of recovery,
the client will have to prove the attorney's failure to exercise reasonable
care." The attorney's fiduciary duty to his client is an important factor in
malpractice cases." An attorney, for example, may be liable for his failure
to act affirmatively to protect his client's interests.7
1. See ABA C, roNs oF PROFrssIoNAL ETmIcs No. 6. The attorney has an
ethical responsibility to represent his client competently.
2. See Rottman and Stem, The Risk of Attorney Professional Liability, 28
J. Mo. B. 127 (1972).
3. See pt. V of this comment infra.
4. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Price, 281 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916); Weiner v.
Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973). See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
5 (1956).
5. Cases cited note 4 supra.
6. W. PnossEn, HAMDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs, 726 (4th ed. 1971).
7. E.g., In re Daggs, 384 Mich. 729, 732, 187 N.W.2d 227, 228 (1971).
(400)
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Even though the contract and tort theories involve the same elements
of proof," they may be controlled by different statutes of limitations.9 The
particular theory employed is especially significant in situations where the
plaintiff is not a party to the contract. Because some courts dogmatically
adhere to a "privity" requirement for recovery on a contract, the plaintiff
must be careful to show that the recovery sought is based on a negligence
theory. In any event, it is clear that an attorney's liability need not arise
from a contractual relationship. Thus an attorney may be liable where the
client was not a paying one, or when there was no actual agreement to
represent.'0
B. Standard of Care
General speaking, the attorney is not an insurer of the cause which he
espouses.". His obligation is to advise the client as to the validity of a cause
of action or defense and the likelihood of success, but he does not guarantee
results. Nor is the attorney liable for every mistake. Especially in the con-
duct of litigation, courts recognize that the best of attorneys make errors
or take positions that later turn out to be erroneous.' 2 Thus, a mere loss of
a lawsuit is not in itself actionable negligence. There must as least be a
failure to exercise reasonable care and skill.'3
Early cases held that attorneys were liable only for gross negligence. 14
The modern rule, however, is similar to that applied to physicians: attorneys
are liable to clients for damages resulting from the failure to exercise that
degree of care, skill, professional knowledge, and diligence which is com-
monly possessed by members of the legal profession. 15
8. E.g., Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 8d 176, 181, 491 P.2d 421, 423, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 887, 839 (1971); Lewis v. Collins, 260 So. 2d 357, 360 (La. Ct. App.
1972); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1970).
9. § 516.120, RSMo 1969. Missouri applies the same statutory period to
both contract and negligence actions.
10. Fort Myers Seafood Packers Inc. v. Steptoe, 381 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. Cir.
1967); cert. denied, 890 U.S. 946 (1968); Central Cab v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542,
549, 270 A.2d 662, 666 (Md. App. 1970). Cf. Fish v. Kelly, 144 Eng. Rep. 78(C.P. 1864) (denying recovery where the attorneys advice was given in casual
conversation); W. PnossEn, HANDBOOK oF THE Lw oF TORTs 706 (4th ed. 1971):
"An attorney or physician who gives curbstone advice when it is requested by
one who is not a client or patient is required only to give an honest answer." These
latter sources indicate that there must be some minimum degree of relationship
or justifiable reliance before the attorney will be held liable.
11. Talbot v. Schroeder, 13 Ariz. App. 230, 231, 475 P.2d 520, 521 (1970);
Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968); Denzer v. Rouse, 48
Wis.2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970).
12. E.g., Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
13. Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405 (St. L. Mo. App. 1985). There is
language in some cases to the effect that an attorney is not liable for errors made
in good faith. See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
But this is contradictory to an objective "reasonable attorney" standard, and these
cases can only apply when a reasonable attorney could have acted as the defen-
dant attorney did. See Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufldn-Beaumont, 215
S.W.2d 904, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
14. E.g., Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1087, 63 S.W.2d 841(1933); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 831, 41 N.W. 417 (1889).
15. Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 83, 378 S.W.2d 655, 661 (1964); Gabbert
1974]
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Missouri law fails to specify whether the standard of care is based on
local, state-wide, or nation-wide conduct in the profession. 6 At issue is
whether an attorney in a rural area, with a limited library, is held to the
same standard as an attorney in a metropolitan area. A minority of jurisdic-
tions apply a local standard, 17 but the better and more common rule is to
hold all attorneys within a particular state to a state-wide standard.18 There
are few cases in this area, primarily because the difference between the
standards is minimal. Theoretically at least, an attorney should be liable
even under a "same locality" standard if he undertook a case or a task
about which he lacked knowledge or access to knowledge.
One jurisdiction has held that an attorney's compliance with prevalent
community standards was not an absolute defense. In Gleason v. Title Guar-
antee Co.,'" the Fifth Circuit held an attorney liable where he relied on a
phone conversation with an abstract company representative as the basis
for his erroneous title opinion. In response to the attorney's assertion that
his conduct was a common practice among attorneys in that area due to a
real estate boom which had put the abstract company and recorders office
behind in filing and recording, the court said, "All customs are not good cus-
toms.... and lawyers have no prescriptive right to make knowingly false
statements in the name of custom."20 The rationale for the holding in Gleason
is analogous to that underlying the rule in other tort actions, that an industry
practice is evidence, but not conclusive proof, of reasonableness. 2'
A recurrent question in malpractice actions is the status of expert testi-
mony.22 Although it is generally agreed that expert testimony is admissible,23
the issue whether expert testimony is always required has never been re-
solved in Missouri. It is difficult to say which is the better view. Logically,
since the standard of care is stated in terms of the "reasonable attorney,"
the proof should require testimony as to the practices of attorneys. Such
testimony would necessarily be given by experts. Requiring expert witnesses,
however, would be excessive in cases where negligence is blatant,24 and the
v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, 293, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914);
McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 384, 132 A. 102, 103 (Ct. Err. & App.
1914).
16. Cf. Mo. Approved Instr. § 11.06 (1973), indicating a state-wide standard
in medical malpractice cases.
17. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d
239, 244 (1972); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
18. E.g., Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1971); Cook, Flanagan &
Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 866 (1968).
19. 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962).
20. Id. at 814. The false statement referred to was the attorney's statement
that the title certification was based on personal examination when in fact it was
not. It is important to note that the same result could conceivably have been
achieved here by applying a state-wide standard of performance.
21. W. PnossEn, supra note 6, at 167.
22. See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1442 (1968).
23. E.g., Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964).
24. See Bonhiver v. Rotenberg, 461 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1972). Drawing
an analogy from medical malpractice cases, the court recognized that some cases
of attorney malpractice in which the negligence was "grossly apparent" did not
[Vol. 39
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client either neglects to or is unable to present expert testimony. Such a
requirement could be especially onerous if attorneys are reluctant to be an
expert witness against the members of their own profession. If the lack of
care is clear without expert testimony, then its absence should not defeat
recovery.25
The best practice would be to follow the rule applied in medical mal-
practice cases. Expert testimony is essential to support an action for mal-
practice, except where the lack of skill or want of care is such as to be
within the common knowledge and experience of laymen.26 Though this is
conclusory, it does provide a standard which is reasonably flexible and has
been workable in medical malpractice cases. As in the latter cases, the
exception should be of narrow bounds, limited to cases of obvious negli-
gence. However, this exception will apply to attorney malpractice actions
more often than to medical malpractice cases, because a greater portion of
the attorney's work involves skills and judgments of a type common to the
business world and should, therefore, be more readily comprehensible to
laymen.
C. Causation and Damages
The issues of causation and damages are necessary elements of recovery,
but are often not clearly delineated in the cases.27 The damages issue in-
volves a determination of whether the plaintiff suffered injury.28 If the claim
lost through attorney malpractice would not have resulted in recovery in
any event,29 or if the defense lost would not have prevented recovery, 0 or
if the right lost was of no value,31 then there are no damages. Proof of
require expert testimonty, but held that such obvious negligence did not exist in
this case. Cf. Starr v. Mooslin, 14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1971),
recognizing the exception. Contra, Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966);
Olson v. North, 276 IM. App. 457 (1934). These cases involved alleged errors
of judgment in negotiating a settlement of a claim and conduct of a murder trial
respectively. Considering the latitude given attorneys in these areas, it is unclear
what the Illinois court would do in a case of obvious negligence. Illinois recognizes
the exception for "grossly apparent" negligence in medical malpractice cases. See
Bonhiver v. Rotenberg, supra.
25. Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (Md. App. 1970).
26. W. PRossR, supra note 6, at 164.
27. E.g., Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The
court held, in an action against an attorney for allegedly causing the loss of plain-
tiffs wrongful death claim, that the attorney could prove lack of causation by
showing that the decedents death was caused by other factors than medicalmalpractice (upon which plaintiff's claim wvas based). This was properly an issue
of damages; i.e., the attorney was the cause of the lost claim, but the claim was
invalid and therefore valueless.
28. E.g., In re Novolich, 7 Wash. App. 495, 500 P.2d 1297 (1972). "It is
axiomatic that there must be injury before negligence is actionable." Id. at 500,
500 P.2d at 1302.
29. Johnson v.-Haskins, 119 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1938); National Hollow Brake
Beam Co. v. Bakewell, 224 Mo. 203 123 S.W. 561 (1909).
30. E.g., Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935).
81. Goldzier v. Poole, 82 Ill. App. 469 (1899); (failure to recover against
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damage is a significant hurdle for the client in malpractice cases. It actually
involves a suit within a suit. In addition to proving negligence and causation,
the client must also prove that his defense or claim in the original action
was valid.
The causation issue involves determining whether the attorney's acts
produced the damage. There must be, at the least, "but for" causation.32
The plaintiff must show that "but for" the attorney's allegedly negligent act,
the damage would not have occurred.33 Where, however, there are two
concurrent "causes," each of which combine to cause the injury, or where
one negligent act is followed by another and both combine to cause the
injury, the policy considerations of proximate causation come into play. In
these cases, courts utilize the "substantial factor"34 and "independent inter-
vening cause"35 tests respectively.
III. LABmrY To TmD PARTES
A question that has troubled courts for years is the scope of a defen-
dant's liability to persons with whom he has not dealt.86 This area of the
law has suffered from an injection of contract concepts into tort analysis.
In the usual tort case, the question whether, as a matter of law, a particular
plaintiff will be allowed to present his case to a jury depends basically, on
considerations of public policy and fairness. 37 This demands consideration
of the connection between the alleged tortious conduct and the harm suf-
fered, culpability, forseeability, and the deterrent effect of a finding of
liability on future conduct.
The contract approach is different. In contract cases, only parties to the
contract or third party beneficiaries embraced by the agreement are entitled
to benefit from the contractual rights.38 As a consequence, when acts which
breach a contract also damage someone who is not a party to it, the tort and
contract approaches overlap, and courts wrestle with the application of the
privity of contract doctrine to the tortious aspect of the acts.39 Thus, since
82. W. PRossEn, supra note 6, at 288.
88. Trustees of Schools v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 278 N.E.2d 431(1971); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970).
84. Modica v. Crist, 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 146, 276 P.2d 614, 617 (1954).
The court quoting Prosser, "Proximate Cause in California" 88 CALF. L. REv.
869, 878 held that "[d]efendants conduct is a cause of the event if it was a
material element and substantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it is such a
substantial factor is for the jury to determine, unless the issue is so clear that
reasonable men cannot differ."Id, at 146, 276 P.2d 614, 617. See W. PRossER,
supra note 6, at 240.
85. Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash.2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958). The court
rejected the "sole causation" requirement and held that an intervening event
would not break the chain of causation if "in the course of events that it might
reasonably have been anticipated by the wrongdoer . . " Id. at 584, 328 P.2d
at 166. See W. PRossEn, supra note 6, at 270.
86. See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1972).
87. See W. Prosser, supra note 6, at 244.
88. Rosell v. Barcus, 89 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Crow v. Kaup, 50
S.W.2d 999 (Mo. 1932).
39. See, e.g., Anderson v. Boone County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo.
1967). Although the court seemed willing to entertain the possibility of a tort
(Vol. 39
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Winterbottom v. Wright,40 courts have been attempting to separate the
two concepts.41
As in other areas of tort law, "privity" analysis has been a barrier to
third party recovery in attorney malpractice cases. Some jurisdictions, in-
cluding Missouri,42 have held that an attorney is liable to third parties only
for intentional acts. Fortunately, there is a trend in other areas of tort law
and in legal malpractice to extend liability to third persons.
The leading case involving an attorneys liability to third persons is
Lucas v. Hamm.43 This case stated that an attorney can be held liable to
beneficiaries of a will for its negligent preparation. A provision in the will
violated the rule against perpetuities, thereby causing a loss to one of the
intended beneficiaries. The court emphasized that damages are clearly
foreseeable in the case of an invalidated will, and that if the intended bene-
ficiaries cannot recover for the attorneys negligence, then no one else could
bring the cause of action.44 Though the court showed typical leniency in
holding that the rule against perpetuities was difficult to understand and
a "net spread for the unwary,"4 5 and that therefore the attorney was not
negligent, the case has been followed in subsequent California cases holding
attorneys liable without the requirement of privity of contract.4
Lucas was preindicated by an earlier California case, Biakania v.
Irving.47 Biakania held that liability would be determined in each case by
balancing various factors based on policy considerations affecting the causa-
tion issue.48 These factors include: (1) The extent to which the transaction
action and discussed the tort aspects at length, it first discussed and dismissed the
possibility of a contract recovery due to a lack of privity. Id. at 128.
40. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). This case denied recovery
to an employee-driver injured in a mail coach accident. The defendant contracted
with the Postmaster to keep the coaches in repair. However, neither the plaintiff
nor his employee were parties to the maintenance contract.
41. One of the first cases to make this distinction clear was Glanzer v.
Shepard, 288 N.Y. 236, 185 N.E. 275 (1922), which recognized that an act
arising out of contractual performance could also result in tort liability to plain-
tiffs other than the contractual parties. A later case by the same court, Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), seemed to limit the
class of permitted plaintiffs to persons who were known to the actor who breached
the contract, but continued to recognize the tort nature of the liability.
42. Lackey v. Vickery, 57 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944); McDonald v.
Stewart, 289 Minn. 85, 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970).
48. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 864 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied,
868 U.S. 987 (1962).
44. Id. at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
45. Id. at 592, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
46. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 228, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969);
Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971). But see Haldane
v. Freedman, 204 Cal. App. 2d 475, 22 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1962). See also Licata v.
Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (Ct. C. P. 1966); Ramp v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 289 (1972); Woodfork v.
Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 1971), writ denied, 259 La. 759, 252 So. 2d
455 (1971). These cases have followed the California rationale in allowing
recovery to intended beneficiaries of wills that have been invalidated due to the
attorney's negligence.
47. 49 Cal. 2d 639, 647, 820 P.2d 16 (1958).
48. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
1974]
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was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that he suffered injury; (4) the close-
ness of the connection between the conduct and the injury suffered; and
(5) the policy of preventing future harm.49
Donald v. Garry0 is the most extreme California case imposing liability
on an attorney to a third party. In Donald, the plaintiff was a creditor who
had turned a debt over to a credit collection agency. The collection agency
employed the defendant attorney to file suit, but the case was dismissed for
want of diligent prosecution. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal
holding that if the allegations were true, the attorney was liable to the
plaintiff even though there was no privity of contract between them.5 1
Citing Restatement Second of Torts52 and previous California cases, the
court reasoned that the transaction had been intended primarily for the
plaintiffs benefit, that the damage to the plaintiff was clearly foreseeable,
and that the plaintiff was unquestionably injured by the attorneys negli-
gence. The court also pointed out that public policy favored encouragement
of diligent prosecution of lawsuits.
The only case purporting to state the Missouri rule as to an attorney's
liability to third parties is Lackey v. Vickery.5 3 In Lackey, plaintiff sued a
client and his attorney for their intentional failure to take action to remove
the lien on his property after he had paid the judgment from which the lien
resulted. The court, purporting to apply Missouri law, but citing only Corpus
Juris Secundum, held that an attorney is liable to a third party only for
malicious or fraudulent acts. The case, however, has limited precedential
value because of its peculiar facts54 and lack of analysis.
Under the restrictive rule of Lackey, most plaintiffs would have to
recover on third-party beneficiary contract theory. It is clearly the law in
Missouri that a contract for valid consideration between two parties for the
benefit of a third may be enforced by the third party, even though that
person was not named in the contract, was not in privity to the contract, or
was ever aware of the making of the contract. 5 Some attorney malpractice
cases might fit into this type of analysis. This theory has limited value,
however, because it probably requires that the benefit running to the third
party' be direct.56
Because of the paucity of Missouri cases involving attorney's liability
to third parties, the essential considerations must be gleaned from Missouri
49. Id.
50. 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971).
51. Id. at 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
52. RE STATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS, § 324 A (1965). This section deals
with liability to third persons for negligent performance of an undertaking.
53. 57 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944).
54. The actual tort alleged was an intentional tort and the cause of action
was properly against the attorney's client.
55. Rosell v. Barcus, 89 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Crow v. Kaup, 50
S.W.2d 995 (Mo. 1982).
56. For example, advice given to a client which may benefit business asso-
ciates, protect creditors, etc. is indirect. See REsTATEmmNT (SEcoND) oF TonRs§ 324 A (1965) (liability to third persons for negligent acts); RESTATEMENT oF
TonRTs § 552 (1938) (negligent supplying of information).
[Vol. 39
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cases concerning the liability of other professionals. In Anderson v. Boone
County Abstract Co.,57 the abstract company negligently omitted a restric-
tive convenant from an abstract it prepared. The abstract was prepared for
a predecessor in title to the plaintiff with whom the plaintiff had not
dealt. Plaintiffs alleged that they had relied on the abstract in purchas-
ing the land for commercial use which was prohibited by the restrictive
covenant. The court held that lack of privity barred an action on the con-
tract, and that the plaintiffs were too remote to recover on a theory of
negligent misrepresentations. 8
In Slate v. Boone County Abstract Co.,59 on the other hand, the seller
of property had hired the abstract company to prepare an abstract to be
delivered to the purchasers. Purchasers alleged that they were damaged by
the company's failure to include a utility easement in the abstract. Recovery
was allowed on a third party beneficiary theory.
Westerhold v. Carroll60 involved an architect's liability to an indemnitor
of a surety. The defendant architect had been hired by the land owner to
supervise the construction of a building on the land and to advise the owner
when progress payments were due on work completed. Although a per-
formance bond was required, the surety was not a party to the construction
contract, and the plaintiff's contract as indemnitor was with the surety
only. The architect negligently approved progress payments in excess of
work performed. When the contractor defaulted, the indemnitor's cost of
completion exceeded the amount remaining due on the contract from the
owner, resulting in a loss. The indemnitor sought to recover this loss from
the architect. The court recognized the tort nature of the case and that
"a party by entering into a contract may place himself in such a relation
toward third persons as to impose upon him an obligation to act in such
a way that the third persons will not be damaged."6' Emphasizing that the
defendant should have foreseen the surety's reliance on his decisions as to
progress payments, the court remanded the case, adopting the view of
Biakanja v. Irving62 that "whether or not in a specific case the defendant
will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves a balancing of factors. . ..63
57. 418 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1967).
58. Id. at 128. The court discussed RnSTATE~m=E or TORTS, supra note 56,
at § 552, but, without rejecting the principle, declined to apply § 552 to this
case because it felt that extension of liability to the class of "potential purchasers"
was too great a burden on abstracters. Language in the concluding paragraph of
the Anderson opinion indicates, however, that the court might be willing to allow
a third party to recover if he was (1) identifiable and (2) the defendant should
have known of the plaintiff's reliance.
59. 432 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1968).
60. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
61. Id. at 80.
62. 49 Cal 2.d 647, 820 P.2d 16 (1958).
63. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. The court stated the factors to be (1) the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the for-
seeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendants conduct and
the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendants conduct;(6) and the policy of preventing future harm. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
1974]
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The most recent case involving this question is Aluma Kraft Manu-
facturing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.64 In that case, the court followed the
rationale of Westerhold and held the defendant accounting firm liable for
negligence in preparation of a financial statement which the defendant
knew was to be relied on by the plaintiff as a means of determining the
price of stock to be purchased by plaintiff from the defendant's dmployer.
These cases indicate the probable result in an attorney malpractice
case involving liability to persons .not in privity. They show that Missouri
courts do recognize that tort and contract liability may co-exist in the same
fact situation, with a different scope of' liability being recognized for
tortious acts. Significantly, although the Missouri courts have yet to grant
relief to a plaintiff not known to the defendant, the balancing test65 which
the court purports to apply in both Westerhold and Aluma Kraft seems to
leave open this possibility.60
IV. DEFENSES
A. Assumption of the Risk and Contributory Negligence
The common tort defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk are typically inapplicable to most legal malpractice fact situa-
tions. Assumption of the risk requires voluntary acceptance of a known
risk.07 It is therefore inapplicable to the normal attorney-client relationship,
where the conduct of litigation or preparation of legal document is entrusted
completely to the attorney.6s Such a defense would be relevant to a mal-
practice case if an attorney engaged in a particular negligent course of
action at the specific request of a client who had been fully advised of the
risks and all viable alternatives.
The defense of contributory negligence is also rarely available, the
entire conduct of litigation or completion of a legal task normally being
entrusted to the attorney. Nonetheless, in some cases, certain overt acts or
failures of cooperation on the client's part which effectively prevent an
attorney from adequately prosecuting or defending an action have been
held to absolve an attorney from alleged negligence. 69 Of course, in addition
to providing a contributory negligence defense, obstructive actions by a
client can defeat his cause of action by breaking the requisite chain of
causation, which is a sine qua non of recovery.
64. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
65. See note 63 supra.
66. A logical extension would be to allow plaintiffs of a reasonably defined
and forseeable class to recover for negligent providing of advice or services. See
Tartera v. Palumbo, 453 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1970) (surveyor liable to purchasers
of subdivision lots for survey errors made before the purchasers were identified).
67. W. PnossEn, supra note 6, at 440.
68. But see Carr v. Glover, 70 Mo. App. 242 (1897), where the client him-
self was a skilled attorney and chose the form of pleadings, and thus he could not
recover for the adverse consequences of their use.
69. See Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1971)(failure of client to appear at a hearing at which a lesser punishment had been
arranged); Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866(1961) (recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to an attorney mal-
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B. Statute of Limitations
A more viable defense available to an attorney is the statute of limita-
tions.70 The period of limitation for both contract and negligence actions
in Missouri is five years.7 1 Different states offer varying definitions of when
the statute begins to run: (1) the time of the negligent act;72 (2) the time
of discovery of the negligent act,73 or (3) the time that damages are sus-
tained.74 Missouri has opted for a minority rule. The Missouri statute
provides that the period of limitations for malpractice begins when "damage
resulting therefrom is sustained and capable of ascertainment ... .,,7 This
rule, in the usual situation, seems to be the most just. It adequately protects
plaintiffs from loss of their claims without being so liberal as to unreason-
ably overburden attorneys with the defense of stale claims. Since a client
must show damages to recover, it would be unjust to start the statute run-
ning at the time of the negligent act, or even at the time of discovery of
such act, since the act will often occur long before any damages are suffered
or made certain. Insofar as an attorney's advice or work has lasting effect
on a client's affairs, a contrary rule would greatly reduce the client's ability
to recover for malpractice.
There are several important exceptions to the general rule in Missouri
that act to extend the limitation period. If the grounds for relief are fraud,
the cause of action is deemed to accrue when the fraud is discovered by
the aggrieved party, so long as it is within ten years of the facts constituting
the fraud. 6 When the basic five year period is added to this ten year
extension,"" there is a possible fiften year statute of limitations on undis-
covered frauds. Also, where the defendant prevents the commencement of
an action by absconding, or concealing himself, or "other improper acts"7 8
(interpreted to mean fraudulent act), 79 the statute will be tolled until such
practice claim); Benton v. Craig, 2 Mo. 198 (1830) (failure to provide neces-
sary information); Delfyette v. Fisher, 40 A.D.2d 674, 386 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1972)(failure to submit to a physical exam); and Zeitlin v. Morrison, 167 App. Div.
220. 152 N.Y.S. 1000 (1915) (failure to return or sign necessary documents).
But see Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., 414 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1967) (defendant
could not assert as a defense the negligence of a subsequent attorney in failing
to salvage the claim lost by defendant); and Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218(N.D. 1971) (client not contributorily negligent in failing to take steps to perfect
his security interest when he had no knowledge of the necessity of doing so).
70. See generally, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968).
71. § 516.120, RSMo 1969.
72. N.Y. Civ. PnAc. § 214 (McKinney 1972).
73. Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971)
(recognizing the need for a special rule for attorney malpractice cases); and
Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963) (recognizing
the discovery rule in title examination cases according to statute).
74. E.g., Fort Myers Seafood Packers Inc. v. Steptoe, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1967, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
75. § 516.100, RSMo 1969.
76. § 516.120(5), RSMo 1969.
77. § 516.120, RSMo 1969.
78. § 516.280 RSMo 1969.
79. E.g., Davis v. Carp, 258 Mo. 686, 167 S.W. 1042 (1914); Schrabauer v.
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improper acts have ceased. 0 Although the Missouri statute has been inter-
preted to require an act of concealment greater than mere silence,"' the
confidential relationship of an attorney and client gives rise to a duty to
disclose. Accordingly, mere silence on the part of an attorney could consti-
tute fraudulent concealment.8 2
Applying the above rationale, Missouri courts have held that, where
an attorney withholds money or fails to pay over money collected for a
client, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the client learns
of the existence of the money.83 In some instances, however, the statute may
not begin to run until a demand is made, a time potentially later than when
the client learns of the existence of the money. To recover in an action for
money collected, it must be alleged that a demand for the money has been
made, but refused by the attorney.8 4 This issue should depend on the rela-
tionship between the attorney and client at the time the client learns of the
existence of the money. 5 If the attorney-client relationship is such that the
client could expect that the attorney is holding the money as a fiduciary, or
if such has been their previous custom, then the statutory period does not
commence until demand is made. If the client learns that the attorney is
holding money that is rightfully his and there is no reason for him to believe
that the attorney is acting in good faith, then he is put on notice of the
wrongful act and the statutory period commences as of that date.
In the areas of legal drafting and legal advisement, the Missouri rule
works a considerable extension of the period of liability. For instance, the
District of Columbia, applying the same rule as Missouri, held that the
statute of limitations did not start running against a client who had been
negligently advised on a contract until the damage occurred. 86 Kansas,
applying a similar rule, held that a cause of action by a beneficiary of a
will did not accrue until the courts had declared the will invalid.87 Despite a
general rule of commencing their statute at the time of the negligent act,
California courts have held that, since damages are a necessary element of
proof in malpractice cases and because of the fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, the statutory period does not begin until the
damage is done and the client is aware of facts constituting a cause of
action.88 One California court noted that a contrary rule would have meant
80. § 516.280, RSMo 1969.
81. Piggott v. Denton, 46 S.W.2d 618 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932).
82. E.g., Hood v. McConemy, 53 F.R.D. 435, 447 (D.C. Del. 1971). See
W. PnossEn, supra note 6, at 697 (4th ed. 1971).
83. Donahue v. Bragg, 49 Mo. App. 273 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892); Aultman,
Miller & Co. v. Loring, 76 Mo. App. 66 (K.C. Ct. App. 1898).
84. Houx v. Russell, 10 Mo. 246 (1846).
85. That is, if the attorney is continuing in a fiduciary relationship, mere
retention of the money is not sufficient to start the period running even if the
client knows the attorney has the money. See Birckhead v. De Forest, 120 F. 645(2d Cir. 1903); Browder v. DaCosta, 91 Fla. 1, 109 So. 448 (1925).
86. Fort Myers Seafood Packers Inc. v. Steptoe, 881 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 890 U.S. 946 (1968).
87. Price v. Holmes, 198 Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976 (1967).
88. Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 8d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971);
Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
[Vol. 39
11
Vickers: Vickers: Attorney Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE
that no one could have shown damages unless the testator died before the
end of the statutory period.89
The longevity which the Missouri statute of limitations imposes on
malpractice actions in the nonlitigation areas appears somewhat harsh.90
Nonetheless, attorneys have little cause to complain. What the courts take
with one hand, they return with the other. The client's favorable statute of
limitations in advisement malpractice cases is offset by the great difficulty
inherent in proving causation in such cases. In such cases the statute of
limitations may not have run after twenty years; nevertheless, no recovery
is available unless the attorney has negligently "caused" damages.
V. LAB]rr i N Si 'cinc SrruATioNs
The preceding general discussion of attorney malpractice can be better
understood by analyzing an attorney's liability in specific situations. For
instance, an attorney might be sued for failure to bring his client's suit or
for failure to appear and defend a suit brought against the client.91 The
problem for the client in this situation is proving cauqation and damages.
This involves proving two cases. Not only must the client prove the attorney's
negligence caused the loss of a claim or defense, but he must also show that
he suffered injury as a result of the loss.92 In other words, the client must
litigate all the issues involved in the original case in addition to the question
of the attorney's negligence in handling it.
A common source of liability is negligent failure to comply with pro-
cedural rules. Examples of common errors include failure to comply with
notice requirements,93 misnaming of parties,94 errors in pleadings,9" and
bringing an action on an improper theory.96 Any one of these mistakes may
result in liability, if the mistake resulted in damages.97 Luckily, under
modern rules with liberal pleading and joinder provisions, the careless
attorney can often rectify his procedural errors before they cause damage.
Despite the fact that procedural rules have been complied with, clients
will, on occasion, claim malpractice on the basis of the general conduct of
the litigation.98 These allegations rarely result in recovery, however, because
89. Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1971).
90. Thorne v. Johnson, 488 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972) (applying
present statute to abstractors liability).
91. Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (Md. App. 1970);
of. Roehlv. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405 (St. L. Mo. App. 1985).
92. Jones v. Wright, 19 Ga. App. 242, 91 S.E. 265 (1917).
93. McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 874, 115 N.E. 481 (1917).
94. O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 865
(1929).
95. Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer, 79 S.W. 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
96. Cf. Eberhardt v. Harkless, 115 F. 816 (W.D. Mo. 1902) (recovery
denied for lack of proof of causation).
97. Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 288, 298, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1914).
98. Boynton v. Brown, 108 Ark. 513, 145 S.W. 242 (1912). In this case
failure to seek a continuance was the basis for a cause of action against an attorney,
but recovery was denied for failure to prove breach of standard of care. Brock v.
Fouchy, 76 Cal. App. 2d 363, 172 P.2d 945 (1946) (failure to introduce evi-
19741
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss3/5
MISSOURI LAW PLEVIEW
it is difficult to show that the attorney has acted unreasonably. It is recog-
nized that an attorney must make many decisions during a trial that in
retrospect appear to have been errors, despite the fact that they were quite
reasonable at the time they were made according to facts then available
or strategy therein being applied.99 As a general rule, the courts are very
lenient to attorneys in these cases.
Other common areas of dispute arise from allegations of improper
settlements, or failure to take steps necessary to preserve a client's right to
appellate review. 00 Familiar problems arise in both cases. As to the former,
the client must prove that he could have recovered (or have paid less) had
the claim been fully litigated.' 01 In the latter, the client must show that he
could have prevailed on appeal.10 2 In either case, there must be a showing
that the attorney acted unreasonably.
Numerous nonlitigational activities are ripe sources for malpractice
actions, 03 none of which is more fecund than title opinions. 0 4 Although to
date there is only one reported Missouri case involving attorney malpractice
for a negligently researched opinion,105 insurance statistics indicate that this
is one of the most common sources of malpractice claims. 06 The dearth of
reported cases in Missouri probably reflects the fact that once the existence
of adverse claimants is brought to the attention of the embarrassed title
examiner, he is often able to prevent loss either by bringing a quiet title
suit or by quietly persuading remote claimants to give quit claim deeds.
Conflicts of interest can also be the basis of a legal malpractice action.107
Due to the fiduciary relationship of an attorney to his client, the attorney
has an affirmative obligation to disclose any facts important to the interests
dence); Farmers Ins. v. District Court, 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973) (failure to
answer a show cause order held to be inexcusable neglect).
99. Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, 298, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1914).
100. Kruegel v. Porter, 186 S.W. 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). See also Boss-
Harrison Hotel Co. v. Barnard, 148 Ind. App. 406, 408, 266 N.E.2d 810, 811(1971) (stating that '[G]ood appellate advocacy demands the regular reading
of the Advance Sheets .... ).
101. Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905).
102. Trustees of Schools v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 278 N.E.2d 431(1971); Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, 294, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1914).
103. Fort Myers Seafood Packers Inc. v. Steptoe, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968) (negligence in drafting a contract);
Palmer v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Me. 1966) (negligent drafting of a land
sales contract); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rlptr. 225
(1969) (negligence in will drafting); Brackett v. H. R. Block & Co., 119 Ga. App.
144, 166 S.E.2d 369 (1969) (negligent preparation of a tax return). See generally,
Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1863 (1959) (Wills); and Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1972)
(Tax preparers).
104. Renkert v. Title Guar. Trust Co., 102 Mo. App. 267, 76 S.W. 641 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1903).
105. Id.
106. Rottman and Stem, The Risk of Attorney Professional Liability, 28 J.
Mo. B. 127, 136 (1972) (42 percent based on a 1952 survey).
107. E.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592(1966).
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of the client, including any potential conflicts of interest between the client
and the attorney.108 The Code of Professional Responsibility tolerates some
representation by one attorney of parties with conflicting interests, but only
if the attorney fully discloses the nature and extent of the conflict to both
parties.10 9 Failure to disclose, even if arising from oversight or failure to
recognize a conflict, may result in an action for negligence. This cause of
action requires the same proof as any other malpractice suit, causation and
damages still being prerequisities to recovery.
There are four principal categories of fact situations in which these
conflicts of interest arise: (1) Representation of both husband and wife
in matrimonial proceedings,' 10 (2) representation of both insurer and
insured,'" (2) representation of both debtor and creditor,1 2 and (4) repre-
sentation of both buyer and seller." 3 Since the conflicts which arise in such
situations are numerous and diverse, they will not be fully discussed here.
However, attorneys should be conscious of this potential liabilty, and protect
themselves by being alert for possible conflicts of interest and by making
full disclosure when doubtful situations arise.
VI. RmiMF_1S
The most common recourse for a client who is injured by an attorney's
negligence is to bring a tort action for money damages. It has been said
that equitable relief is unavailable in cases of malpractice." 4 This is prob-
ably true, since equitable remedies would rarely be appropriate in a case
of negligence. Nonetheless, equitable remedies would rarely be appropriate
in a case of negligence. Nonetheless, equitable remedies would undoubtedly
be appropriate to secure recovery of documents or other unique property
wrongfully withheld by an attorney." 5 Similarly, in some instances, it might
be proper to sue for rescission of a deed where the attorney acted adversely
to the client's interests.-16 Thus, it seems inappropriate to flatly reject the
possibility of equitable relief in all malpractice suits.
A Missouri statute provides one special remedy." 7 It allows for entry
of judgment against an attorney where the attorney's failure to appear and
defend resulted in dismissal of the client's suit or entry of judgment against
him. This remedy is rarely utilized, however, probably because of a reluc-
tance to enter judgment against an attorney without an opportunity for a
full hearing on the merits of the case." 8
108. See generally, Annot., 28 A.L.R.8d 889 (1969).
109. ABA CANONS op PnorssioNL ETmcs No. 5 and E.C. 5-16.
110. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
111. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 186, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
112. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 582, 87 A. 98 (1897).
118. In re Zafiratos, 259 Or. 276, 486 P.2d 550 (1971).
114. Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178 (1874), affg 1 Haskell 891, F. Cas.
No. 9122 (C. C. Me. 1872).
115. McGowin v. Remington, 12 Pa. 56, 51 Am. Dec. 584 (Sup. Ct. 1849).
116. Bybee v. S'Renco, 816 Mo. 517, 291 S.W. 459 (1927).
117. § 484.160, RSMo 1969.
118. This statute, if followed in its literal form, would undoubtedly raise
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A nonjudicial remedy is available in certain situations in the form of the
Client Security Fund of the Missouri Bar.11 9 Missouri's fund is similar to
those established in a number of states. The fund is extremely limited in
scope. It specifically excludes claims for "malpractice, non-feasance, or
negligence."1 20 Its principal application is to cases of either defalcation or
embezzlement of money, wrongful taking of property, or failure to turn
over money properly belonging to a client. Recovery is further restricted by
the requirement that the client must have exhausted all his judicial remedies
before dipping into the fund. Additionally, no recovery is allowed unless
the client was defrauded by an attorney who thereafter died, was disbarred
or was declared incompetent. Furthermore, if the attorney is dead or incom-
petent, his actions must have been such as would have warranted disbar-
ment. This formidable list of restrictions appears to make this protection
valueless. Surprisingly, however, the Committee Report on the Client Se-
curity Fund for 1970-71 reported five claims totalling $34,399, though only
47.8 percent of each claim was paid because of a lack of funds.1 21 This
amounted to a total payment of $16,910. Though this plan is a slight im-
provement, the ratio of claims paid to claims made and the small number
of claims presented are evidence of the plan's inadequacies.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fortunately, attorneys are not yet under as much pressure from mal-
practice claims as some other professionals. This might be partially traceable
to the fact that the present Missouri law concerning legal malpractice affords
considerable protection to the attorney as defendant. This is desirable from
a legal viewpoint and is consistent with our general concepts of civil lia-
bility. The bar, however, represents itself as fiduciary, and its interests are
best served by cultivating an image of fairness and responsibility toward its
clients. This interest is ill-served when an attorney who does make an error
turns his back on the client, forcing the client to hire yet another attorney
and undergo further litigation to recover his originally valid claim.
Several steps could be taken. It is not suggested that individual attor-
neys or the bar should reimburse clients on groundless claims, but some
nonjudicial remedy would be desirable in many cases. The Client Security
Fund is a feeble step in the right direction. If its coverage could be expanded
to include malpractice claims, to be reviewed by a panel of attorneys, and
with the cost of the system being distributed to all the bar, both the client
and the public image of the bar would benefit.
Even without such a program, widespread malpractice insurance would
serve the interests of both attorney and client.122 Presumably, in clear cases
119. Client Security Fund Established by Missouri Bar, 22 J. Mo. B. 487(1966).120. Id. at 489.
121. Committee Report, Client Security Fund, 27 J. Mo. B. 647, 649 (1971).
122. Rottman and Stern, The Risk of Attorney Professional Liability, 28 J.
Mo. B. 127, 137 (1972). This article indicates that only 65% of the members of
the Bar have malpractice insurance and that coverage is often inadequate.
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